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==============================
Stable bug-fix release with minor extensions.

All users of cryptsetup 2.x and later should upgrade to this version.

Changes since version 2.3.4
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

* Fix partial reads of passphrase from an interactive terminal.
  Some stable kernels (5.3.11) started to return buffer from a terminal
  in parts of maximal size 64 bytes.
  This breaks the reading of passphrases longer than 64 characters
  entered through an interactive terminal. The change is already fixed
  in later kernel releases, but tools now support such partial read from
  terminal properly.

* Fix maximal length of password entered through a terminal.
  Now the maximal interactive passphrase length is exactly
  512 characters (not 511).

* integritysetup: support new dm-integrity HMAC recalculation options.

  In older kernels (since version 4.19), an attacker can force
  an automatic recalculation of integrity tags by modifying
  the dm-integrity superblock.
  This is a problem with a keyed algorithms (HMAC), where it expects
  nobody can trigger such recalculation without the key.
  (Automatic recalculation will start after the next activation.)

  Note that dm-integrity in standalone mode was *not* supposed
  to provide cryptographic data integrity protection.
  Despite that, we try to keep the system secure if keyed algorithms
  are used.
  Thank Daniel GlÃ¶ckner for the original report of this problem.

  Authenticated encryption that provides data integrity protection (in
  combination with dm-crypt and LUKS2) is not affected by this problem.

  The fix in the kernel for this problem contains two parts.

  Firstly, the dm-integrity kernel module disables integrity
  recalculation if keyed algorithms (HMAC) are used.
  This change is included in long-term stable kernels.

  Secondly, since the kernel version 5.11, dm-integrity introduces
  modified protection where a journal-integrity algorithm guards
  superblock; also, journal sections are protected. An attacker cannot
  copy sectors from one journal section to another, and the superblock
  also contains salt to prevent header replacement from another device.

  If you want to protect data with HMAC, you should always also use HMAC
  for --journal-integrity. Keys can be independent.
  If HMAC is used for data but not for the journal, the recalculation
  option is disabled.

  If you need to use (insecure) backward compatibility implementation,
  two new integritysetup options are introduced:
    - Use --integrity-legacy-recalc (instead of --integrity-recalc)
      to allow recalculation on legacy devices.
    - Use --integrity-legacy-hmac in format action to force old insecure
      HMAC format.

  Libcryptsetup API also introduces flags
    CRYPT_COMPAT_LEGACY_INTEGRITY_HMAC and
    CRYPT_COMPAT_LEGACY_INTEGRITY_RECALC
  to set these through crypt_set_compatibility() call.

* integritysetup: display of recalculating sector in dump command.

* veritysetup: fix verity FEC if stored in the same image with hashes.

  Optional FEC (Forward Error Correction) data should cover the whole
  data area, hashes (Merkle tree), and optionally additional metadata
  (located after hash area).

  Unfortunately, if FEC data is stored in the same file as hash,
  the calculation wrongly used the whole file size, thus overlaps with
  the FEC area itself. This produced unusable and too large FEC data.
  There is no problem if the FEC image is a separate image.

  The problem is now fixed, introducing FEC blocks calculation as:
    - If the hash device is in a separate image, metadata covers the
      whole rest of the image after the hash area. (Unchanged behavior.)
    - If hash and FEC device is in the image, metadata ends on the FEC
      area offset.

  Note: there is also a fix for FEC in the dm-verity kernel (on the way
  to stable kernels) that fixes error correction with larger RS roots.

* veritysetup: run FEC repair check even if root